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ADRIAN VERMEULE*
It's an appropriate time to consider the legacy of judicial review.
Only  rarely  do  deeply  entrenched  doctrines  and  practices  like
judicial review become plausible candidates for rethinking. Yet two
contradictory  trends  have  restored  this  basic  question  to  the
intellectual agenda. On the one hand, judicial review has gained
new vigor in European legal systems,1  and the Rehnquist Court is
currently in  an aggressive phase.2  On the other hand, prominent
Americanjurists such as Mike Klarman, Richard Posner, and Mark
Tushnet, and including Jeremy Waldron as an honorary American,
have  recently  questioned  judicial  review  root-and-branch-a
significant  development  given  that  even  ten  years  ago  a
thoroughgoing  opposition  to judicial  review  was the mark of a
crank.  Judicial  review  is  making  gains  abroad  while  losing  a
measure of intellectual respectability at home.
Is judicial review desirable? I shall supply a three-part answer to
that  question.  First,  normative  analysis  of judicial  review  is
necessarily a consequentialist exercise in institutional choice. The
question we'd like to answer is whether paramount authority to
interpret the Constitution should be lodged in the  judiciary or in the
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This is a version of remarks delivered at
a symposium on the Legacy of John Marshall, held by the Institute of Bill of Rights Law of
the  College  of William  and Mary,  Marshall-Wythe  School  of Law.  Thanks  to  Michael
Gerhardt, Jack  Goldsmith,  David Strauss,  and the symposium participants  for helpful
comments, to Trish Hillier for excellent research assistance, and to the Russell J. Parsons
Faculty Research Fund for its support. Special thanks to Yun Soo Vermeule.
1. BojanBugaric, Courts  asPolicy-Makers:Lessonsfrom  Transition,  42 HAR.INTLL.J.
247, 250-51 (2001).
2. Dahlia  Lithwick,  The  High Court's Eating Disorder, SLATE,  July  3,  2001,  at
http://slate.msn.com/default.aspx?id=111437.
3.  RICHARD  A. POSNER,  FRONTIERS  OF LEGAL THEORY  15-27  (2001); MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS passim (1999); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW
AND  DISAGREEMENT  passim  (1999);  Michael  J.  Klarman,  What's  So  Great About
Constitutionalism?,  93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145 (1998).
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lawmaking  process.4   Nonconsequentialist  commitments,  for
example a commitment to "democracy," usually prove too abstract
to cut between institutional options of this sort. Second, however,
institutional-choice  questions  of this  magnitude  are  excessively
information-demanding.  The  information  necessary to make the
assessment is unobtainable, or at best excessively costly to obtain;
the  scale  of the questions  is too  large;  the interaction  between
institutions  is  too  dynamic  and  complex;  and the  possibility  of
unintended  consequences  from  any  choice  of institutional  ar-
rangement is too great.
Third,  the  combination  of  the  first  two  points  creates  the
dilemma  of institutional  choice:  we can't  assess judicial review
without  answering  questions  that  we  lack  the  information  to
answer. The upshot is that, as I've argued elsewhere, institutional
choice over questions of this magnitude must inevitably fall back
upon a weak repertoire of techniques for practical reasoning under
conditions  of profound  uncertainty.'  I  will  apply some  of those
techniques  to the question  of judicial  review,  but they butt up
against the region where  consequentialism  runs out of steam. In
that region large-scale institutional reforms like abolishing judicial
review require a leap of faith, and I'll conclude with a bit of positive
theorizing  about  what  causes  us  to  take  such  leaps  on  the
infrequent occasions that we do so.
Start by assuming that we can costlessly obtain full information
about  the  determinants  of  the  institutional-choice  question.
Because we need some fixed starting points from which to reason,
I will assume that the only issue at stake is whether Marbury v.
Madison 6  should  be  overruled,  leaving  in  place  all  other
constitutional  provisions  and  doctrines  that regulate  relations
between  the judiciary  and  other  branches  of government.  For
4.  A distinct question is whether the judiciary's interpretive authority, even ifsupreme,
should or should not be exclusive. See Larry D. Kramer, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1,
13 (2001) (arguing that supremacy does not entail exclusivity).
5.  Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 113-28 (2000).
6.  5 U.S. (1  Cranch) 137 (1803).
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expository clarity I'll exclude intermediate institutional forms like
Robert Bork's  proposal that Congress be empowered  to override
constitutional decisions by a majority vote  of each House.  7 I will
assume that the only options under consideration are full judicial
supremacy, on the one hand, and political-branch supremacy, on
the  other.  Now  this procedure  is  mildly unrealistic-obviously
various doctrines of  standingjusticiability, and deference moderate
the current  regime-but it  helps  to  isolate the relevant consid-
erations.
With  full  information,  the  principal  determinants  of  the
institutional  choice  question  are  the  agency  costs  of judicial
review, its moral hazard effects, the optimal rate of legal change,
and the transition costs of switching from a Marbury regime to a
political-supremacy regime. Each of these considerations, however,
implicates  a tangle  of subsidiary  questions,  and  I hope  it  will
become  clear  that  the  information  needed  for  fully  specified
institutional choice far exceeds our present intellectual resources.
AGENCY COSTS
Hamilton's  defense of judicial review in  The Federalist  No. 78
supposes a simple principal/agent model with multiple agents: the
people, as principal, appoint legislative representatives  subject to
the terms of the  agency agreement  (the Constitution),  and also
appoint the judiciary as another agent to enforce the agreement.'  If
the judges were both infallible and perfectly faithful, the Hamilton
model  would  be  persuasive;  whether  it  is  actually  persuasive
depends  on  the  relative  agency  costs  of  judicial  review  and
legislative action.
Agency costs come in  two forms, agent incompetence and agent
self-dealing. The competence issue is whether faithful agents suffer
informational and cognitive  constraints that cause them to make
mistakes, defining "mistake" according to the observer's preferred
substantive  theory of constitutional  interpretation.  Faithful  but
7.  ROBERT  H.  BORK,  SLOUCHING  TOWARDS  GOMORRAH:  MODERN  LIBERALISM  AND
AMERIcAN DECLINE 117-18 (1996).
8.  THEFEDERALISTNO. 78, at  492 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
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fallible judges will issue erroneous rulings of constitutionality and
of unconstitutionality,  and  both weigh  against judicial  review:
excessively lax review suggests that judicial review is unnecessary,
while excessively stringent review suggests that it is afirmatively
harmful. Nor can we optimistically suppose that random errors in
either direction will wash out; even if that is so, we also care about
the constitutional variance produced by our institutional choices. A
judiciary that made a precisely equal  number of errors in either
direction would be far worse than one that made no errors at all.
The self-dealing issue is whether epistemically perfect agents will
use  their authority  to  divert  gains  to  themselves;  here  too  the
consequence  will  be  erroneous  constitutional  decisions  by  the
judges, although caused by self-interest rather than incompetence.
This is a touchy subject for constitutional law professors, because
we like to maintain  civil relations with the judges, but consider
whether it is plausible that self-interest distorts judicial review of
statutes that alter judicial compensation,  as in  United States v.
Will;9 or review of statutes that the Justices lobbied against in the
legislative process, as in United States v. Morrison;  or review  of
electoral outcomes that will determine the identity of the Justices'
colleague~s, as in Bush v. Gore." The latter two cases might also be
described as examples of vanity rather than self-interest, and all of
the cases emphasize that the distinction between incompetence and
self-interest is fuzzy, for cognitive mechanisms such as motivated
reasoning and the self-serving bias may transmute self-interest into
"sincere" error.
It  goes without saying that we can't restrict our attention to the
agency costs inflicted by imperfect judiciaries. We need to compare
the net agency costs of fallible legislatures and fallible courts under
the two alternative institutional  schemes of judicial and political
supremacy. With or withoutMarbury-style review, legislatures may
erroneously reject bills on constitutional grounds or erroneously fail
9.  449 U.S. 200 (1980).
10.  529 U.S. 598(2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)); see also
Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,  Jurisdiction  as Injury: Transforming  the Meaning of  Article
III, 113 HARV.  L. REV. 924, 1005 n.322 (2000) (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist and the
Federal Judicial Conference lobbied against VAWA before its enactment).
11.  531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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to  do  so.  Marbury-style review  adds  the  possibility  that  in-
sufficiently vigorous constitutional review by legislatures will be
corrected,  but  also  adds  the possibility  that erroneous  judicial
invalidations will combine with erroneous legislative rejections to
produce dramatic overenforcement of constitutional rules.
MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS
A further complication is the possibility of dynamic interaction
effects  between legislative  and judicial  determinations  of consti-
tutionality. One possibility is moral hazard:  if judicial review is a
constitutional  insurance  policy  against  erroneous  legislative
determinations,  it  may dilute rather than strengthen legislators'
incentives  to take  precautions  against  erroneous  enactment  of
unconstitutional  statutes.  This is Thayer's  concern that judicial
review  would  dilute  the  statesman's  sense  of  constitutional
responsibility." 2  The concern is parasitic on the assumption that
judges  are fallible:  if judicial review  catches  all and only those
unconstitutional statutes that responsible legislators would catch
anyway in a regime without judicial review, then the moral hazard
effect doesn't change any outcomes. But ifjudges are.  fallible, then
moral hazard may act as a multiplier, causing a net increase in the
number of constitutionally objectionable statutes that survive both
legislative and judicial scrutiny.
OPTIMAL RATE OF LEGAL CHANGE
So far I have assumed that judicial review "invalidates" statutes,
which is  legally  accurate but ignores  the common view that the
practical effect of review is merely to delay a statute's effectiveness
until the process  of presidential  appointment  aligns the Court's
holdings  with  the  nation's  wishes. 3  That  view  makes  strong
assumptions. If the delay is a generation or so, as it was with the
12.  JAMES B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL  107 (1901).
13.  See,  e.g.,  MARK  TUSHNET,  RED,  WHrIE,  AND  BLUE:  A  CRITICAL  ANALYSIS  OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 197-200 (1988) (describing the Realist argument that in the medium-
to-long run  judicial review doesn't matter very much" because of political controls, the most
important being the appointment of new Supreme Court justices).
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child labor laws, then the difference between invalidation and delay
has no cash value to anyone alive at the time of the initial decision.
The  Court's  erroneous  ruling may itself generate  new  interest
groups and social movements that will subsequently immunize the
ruling from reversal, which is one account of the aftermath of Roe
v. Wade.'4 But even on its own terms, the delay point just changes
the  institutional-choice  question  from  one  about  comparative
agency costs and moral hazard to one about the optimal rate of legal
change. We'd need to know whether delay, as measured from the
no-judicial-review  baseline, moves us closer to or farther from the
optimal point.
It's quite possible that the answer is "farther from." Madison was
intensely concerned with slowing the rate of legal change, which he
saw as excessive because of the "inconstancy" and "mutability" of
legislative lawmaking, 5 but he said very little about  judicial review;
he sought to build in the necessary delay through bicameralism,
small  legislatures,  and  long legislative  terms."  Adding judge-
created delay to those structural features is very possibly excessive.
TRANSITION COSTS
A final  consideration is that the question  whether we  should
abolish judicial review is not the same as the question whether we'd
want to institute it if we didn't already have it. The status quo
position matters. The opponents ofjudicial review that I mentioned
earlier elide this distinction, in Waldron's  case because his basic
concern is to prevent the introduction  of judicial review  into the
British legal system." 7  This concern about the costs of transition to
a  regime  of  legislative  supremacy  interacts  with  the  other
considerations that I've mentioned. Thayer's moral-hazard concern
that  judicial review debases legislative responsibility, 8 for example,
14.  410 U.S.  113 (1973);  see, e.g., Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial  Exclusivity and
Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV.  83,  95-96  (1998)  (stating that  social forces  played a
defining role in the Court's later refusal to overrule Roe).
15.  THE FEDERALIsT No.  62, at 410-12 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
16.  Id. at 409-10.
17.  WALDRON, supra note 3, at 211-14.
18.  THAYER, supra  note 12, at 107.
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suggests that a sudden switch from a regime  of vigorous judicial
review  to one  of legislative  supremacy might  prove  disastrous.
Legislators  made  constitutionally irresponsible  by the  previous
regime could hardly adjust instantly to their new obligations, and
if the moral hazard effect dissipated very slowly, the interim period
might pose a real risk of legislative  oppression. Even if the new
long-term  equilibrium  were better  than the  old judicial-review
equilibrium, the transitional disruption might prove so severe as to
block any path from the latter to the former. In  that case, the
current regime ofjudicial review would constitute a local-maximum
trap, akin to the problem facing subsistence farmers who are unable
to switch to more productive technologies because they will starve
to death in  the meantime.
It  should be clear that the number and scope of the variables we'd
need to consider, in  a fully specified institutional-choice analysis of
judicial  review,  is  staggering.  It's  not  feasible  to  acquire  the
necessary information, at least at any reasonable cost within the
short or medium term. To be sure, comparative work on judicial
review in  the political science literature has outlined some of the
relevant  variables, 9  but  it  has  not  made  much  progress  on
specifying their magnitudes. Further, the complexity of social and
political systems means that it's almost always possible to dispute
a comparative  analogy  by pointing to  an omitted  factor-some
plausibly relevant difference  between the United States and the
comparison country. What we can get out of comparative work are
large-scale truths that verge on banalities, such as the truth that
the  absence  of judicial  review  need  not  produce  majoritarian
tyranny, and  a healthy exposure  to the full variety  of judicial-
review  arrangements. 0  The latter sort of information, however,
adds options to the menu of institutional choice and thus makes the
problem more, rather than less, information-demanding.
19.  See, e.g., JUDIcIALINDEPENDENcEINTHEAGEOFDEMOCRAcY:  CRITIcALPERSPECTIvES
FROM AROUND  UE WORLD (Peter H. Russell & David M. O'Brien eds., 2001).
20.  See, e.g.,  id.
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If the desirability  of judicial review  is  an institutional-choice
question, but an intractable one (at least on the current state of
political science and legal theory, and probably for the foreseeable
future as well), what conclusion should we reach? One reaction is
to abandon consequentialist analysis altogether. If the complexity
of "global net long-term  equilibrium  effects" makes institutional
choice indeterminate, we ought on this view to choose institutions
that comport with whatever nonconsequentialist  theory of justice
or theory  of the  good that we happen to hold.2  Those theories,
however, will in most settings prove too abstract to cut between the
choices  available  to us  at the  level  of constitutional  design.  A
commitment to democracy, for example, is compatible with judicial
supremacy if we jigger the institutional variables the right way;22
that's the lesson of Hamilton's resolute discounting of the agency
costs of judicial review in The Federalist  No.  78.2"
The only other recourse is to invoke an eclectic group of tools for
practical reasoning under conditions of profound uncertainty, tools
found in decision theory, rhetoric, and other disciplines. Some are
spurious, for example the use of burdens  of proof-a device that
courts properly use to reduce decision costs and to allocate the risk
of error in the face of uncertainty,2 ' but that academics usually use
as a rhetorical device to close down an argument. So when Judge
Posner says that Waldron and the other skeptics have not proved
that judicial review is a bad idea,'  we're entitled to ask whether
Judge Posner has proved that it's a good one.
A better technique is based on the principle of insufficient reason.
It  instructs  the  decision  maker  to  count  only  known  costs,
eliminating other unknown and unknowable costs from both sides
of the ledger by assuming they will wash out. This sort of reasoning,
21.  See Jon Elster, Arguments for Constitutional  Choice, in  CONSTITUTIONALISM  AND
DEMOCRACY  307-16 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
22.  See FRANKI. MICHELMAN, BRENNANAND DEMOCRACY  19 (1999) (attributing this claim
to Ronald Dworkin).
23.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 489-96 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed.,  1961).
24.  See POSNER, supra note 3,  at 363-79 (describing the use of burdens  of proof in an
adversarial judicial system).
25.  See, e.g., id. at 27 (stating that skeptics have not proved their case against judicial
review).
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like a burden-of-proof rule, may end up incorporating the status quo
into  the analysis,  but it  does so on more respectable grounds. If
the  costs  of transition  from  one  institutional  arrangement  to
another, for example, are clearly positive, and the other variables
on both  sides  are imponderable,  this approach  counsels  against
disrupting the status quo  in  the search for speculative  gains. A
sophisticated defense of judicial review along these lines is David
Strauss'  position:  "[Olur  acceptance  of [judicial  review]  outruns
our belief that it  is theoretically  best ....  One reason is that it
works well enough, and it would be too costly and risky to reopen
the question whether, abstractly considered, it is the best possible
arrangement."26
Here,  I  think,  consequentialism  runs  out  of raw  material.
Strauss' position rejects the search for optimal institutions in favor
of a satisficing approach, in  which everything hinges on how the
aspiration level is  or should  be set-what it  means  for  a given
institutional arrangement to work"well enough.""  This just means
that when the variables relevant to institutional choice proliferate
faster than our information  and computational  capacities,  as  is
frequently the case when fundamental reforms like the abolition of
judicial review are at issue, change will occur when the costs of the
status quo  come to  seem  intolerable  and when  those costs  are
incurred in a particularly salient fashion.
In  such circumstances we have sometimes rejected longstanding
institutional  arrangements,  despite  our inability  to predict the
consequences of the change. Consider the Court's decision in Erie" 8
to  overturn  the  Swift  v.  Tyson29  regime,  in part  because  of a
consequentialist  concern  for  vertical  forum-shopping  between
federal  and state courts. 0  The  optimizer  may protest  that the
switch  to the Erie position may simply replace  vertical forum-
shopping with horizontal forum-shopping; the satisficer may say, a
lh Strauss, that the definite cost of transition from one regime to
the other should dominate the speculative possibility that the new
26.  DavidA. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional  Interpretation,  63 U. CHu. L. REV. 877,
913-14 (1996).
27. Id. at 913-16.
28. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29.  41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled  by Erie,  304 U.S. at 79-80.
30.  Erie,  304 U.S. at 74-77.
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regime will minimize litigants' strategic behavior. By the time of
Erie,  however, there were highly salient examples of the costs of the
Swift v.  Tyson regime-Black & White Taxi"' is the most famous
case-and to many people it  didn't in fact seem that the existing
regime was working "well enough." 32 The Justices were willing to
take an institutional leap of faith, one that consequentialism could
neither endorse nor refute.
If this picture is right, however, judicial review is probably secure
for now.  To provoke  legal  elites into taking a leap  of faith to  a
regime  of legislative  supremacy,  a  leap  even  longer  than  that
involved  in Erie, would require  something like a string of highly
salient  judicial  blunders  akin  to  Dred Scott3  or  Hammer  v.
Dagenhart, 34 coinciding with an energized national majority in firm
control of the national political branches and of the statehouses.
But no current issues are likely to provoke that degree of passion,
and in  any event the Justices have become far too canny to blunder
that badly. It  is no  accident  that Romer v.  Evans
3 5  was handed
down the same day as BMW v. Gore 36 -- the Justices are now more
careful about appeasing constituencies and generating allies across
the political spectrum.
If the normative analysis ofjudicial review is as opaque as I have
portrayed it,  however, we should also be wary of overconfidence in
our ability to predict its staying power as a positive matter. That
was  a major lesson of the collapse  of Soviet communism:  Large-
scale  institutional  changes  often  happen  so  quickly  and  un-
expectedly that learned professors usually deny the possibility up
to the very moment that the change occurs. The legacy of judicial
review  is  secure for  now,  but I  reserve the right to  say that  I
31. Black & White Taxi Cab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1928).
32. Erie, 304  U.S.  at 73-77  (describing defects  of the Swift  doctrine  and noting the
widespread criticism of the doctrine following the Court's decision in Black & White Taxi).
33.  Scott v.  Sanford, 60 U.S.  (19 How.)  393  (1856) (holding that slaves  are not U.S.
citizens), superseded  by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
34.  247  U.S.  251  (1918)  (construing the Tenth  Amendment  narrowly  and  limiting
Congress' Commerce Clause power), overruled inpart  by U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
35.  517  U.S.  620  (1996)  (striking down  state constitutional  classification  based  on
homosexuality).
36.  BMW  of N. Am.,  Inc. v.  Gore,  517 U.S.  559 (1996)  (holding  "grossly excessive"
punitive damages a Due Process Clause violation).
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predicted its demise, if only in  this very contingent and qualified
sense.